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Alexander’s Dictum and the Reality of Familiar Objects 
 
 
 
Alexander’s Dictum at first appears to be entirely reasonable, and almost too bland to be of 
interest.  Who could possibly want to claim reality for entities which cannot, even in principle, produce 
any manifestation of their existence?  It seems hard to deny that there might be some such entities, lurking 
somewhere in the world.  So perhaps Alexander’s Dictum should not be regarded as a constitutive 
principle of ontology.  But its status as a regulative principle seems unassailable. 
How surprising, then, that Alexander’s Dictum can readily appear to require breathtaking 
revisions in the ontology of common sense.  For when combined with familiar worries about causal 
exclusion (see, e.g., Heil and Mele 1993, Sturgeon 1998), it can readily appear to entail that there are in 
the world no familiar medium-sized objects at all, but only the microparticles which—as common sense 
would put it—jointly compose those familiar objects.  When combined with less familiar worries about 
the causal inefficacy of historical properties (Antony 1996, Enç and Adams 1992), Alexander’s Dictum 
can appear to entail the non-existence of a specific sub-group of familiar objects, namely those which if 
real are essentially characterized by historical properties—a group which arguably includes all organs and 
all artifacts (Millikan 1984, Elder 1996, Elder forthcoming). 
In this paper I examine mainly the more general, but also the more specific, challenge to the 
ontology of common sense.  I argue that both challenges rest on confusions.  Alexander’s Dictum is as 
bland and as true as it appears to be, and is no reason for us to lose our Moorings in ontology (to borrow a 
phrase from David Lewis). 
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I 
 
The idea that familiar medium-sized objects have causal powers must lose all plausibility unless 
we can maintain that from time to time such objects actually do cause things to happen.  But widely 
discussed worries about causal exclusion suggest that whenever familiar objects appear to cause things, 
the real causing is being done by microparticles.  In this section I set forth these worries. 
The current discussions of causal exclusion generally1 focus on apparent examples of mental 
causation—on the case in which A’s wanting x, and believing p, bring about an appropriate action on A’s 
part (Heil and Mele 1993, Macdonald and Macdonald 1995).  But the worries I have in mind apply 
equally to any case in which any familiar object appears to bring about some result.  Thus suppose that 
over some centuries a glacier carves a cleft in a range of mountains.  Or suppose that a deciduous tree, as 
it grows, weakens and eventually wipes out a colony of sun-loving ground plants which had occupied the 
place where the seedling sprouted.  In all such cases there is a very close connection between the 
gradually-produced macro-result—the cleft that appears in the mountain range, the weakening of the 
colony of plants—and a vast array of movements and state-changes successively undergone by a vast 
number of microparticles, exactly where that macro-result emerges.  Some hold this close connection to 
be simply a matter of identity (Davidson 1967, 1969).  But others (e.g. Kim 1969, Kim 1980) argue that 
such a ruling individuates events too coarsely; the connection is rather that the vast array of microparticle 
events composes into the establishment of the cleft, or that the establishment of the cleft (at least weakly) 
supervenes on that vast array.  Such relatively fine-grained individuation of events is presupposed by the 
current worries about causal exclusion.  But it independently is the more plausible position, as I elsewhere 
have argued (Elder 2001a). 
Now for the nerve of the causal exclusion worries:  it seems undeniable that any event, simple or 
complex, which qualifies as a cause of such an enormous succession of microparticle movements and 
state-changes thereby qualifies as a cause of the supervening macro-outcome itself—the establishment of 
the cleft, the weakening of the colony.  Now the story of macro-causation tells of a single event (the 
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movement of the glacier, the growth of the tree) which, according to the story, brings about the macro-
outcome.  But it seems intuitively obvious that whenever a familiar object does manage to bring about a 
familiar outcome, the microparticles within the familiar object must, by their several movements and 
state-changes, have managed to bring about the complex micro-outcome which composes into the 
familiar macro-outcome.2 
What seems to follow is that whenever a familiar medium-sized object appears to cause a familiar 
macro-outcome, it sets up a rival claim, to having caused that very outcome, on the part of its component 
microparticles.  Which of these rival claims is the stronger?  There are powerful reasons for answering:  
the claim lodged by the microparticles within the familiar object. 
For one thing, many would hold that whenever an individual event a truly causes individual event 
b, the succession of b upon a must instance, or be underwritten by, general laws of nature (Davidson 
1970).  Now no law of microphysics says that whenever there occurs, in just that sort of sequence, just 
those sorts of microparticle movements as in fact were instanced when the glacier moved, there follows, 
in just that sequence, just those sorts of movements and state-changes as were instanced in the micro-
outcome which composed into the cleft.  Even so, it seems that individual laws of microphysics link every 
individual microparticle event which figured in the glacier’s movement—link it via many intermediate 
steps—to every individual microparticle event which figured in the establishment of the cleft.  And these 
laws of microphysics are precise and exceptionless, or as close to preciseness and exceptionlessness as 
any that nature will yield.  In contrast, the only “laws” that would spell out the effects wrought by 
movements of glaciers as such—or by the growth of deciduous trees—will be imprecise and hedged by 
numerous ceteris paribus clauses.  So, if a claim to having caused an outcome depends on the lawlikeness 
of the generalizations that are instanced, the microparticles in the glacier have a better claim to having 
caused the cleft than the glacier itself does. 
For another thing, glaciers and trees, like any familiar medium-sized objects, appear to be 
compositionally vague.3  That is, it seems that the removal from such an object of a single component 
microparticle always leaves that object still existing.  But then sorites arguments show contradictions to 
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follow from the very idea that there are such objects; whereas individual microparticles are immune to 
such arguments, since they are not compositionally vague.  Now there are, of course, ways to resist the 
paradoxical conclusions of such sorites arguments.  But none is wholly without problems.  So if it turns 
out that we need not affirm the existence of familiar objects, on account of the causal work they 
apparently do, we can simply allow the sorites arguments to stand.  Here then is a second reason to favor 
the claim to causation that is lodged by the microparticles. 
Thus we are left with the disturbing conclusion that whenever a familiar object appears to cause 
anything, it sets up a superior claim, to having caused that very outcome, on the part of its component 
microparticles.  Then unless we are willing to envision causal overdetermination, or engage in some other 
form of special pleading, we will have to concede that familiar medium-sized objects never really cause 
anything.  So they cannot plausibly be said to have causal powers.  So, by Alexander’s Dictum, there 
actually are no such objects in the world. 
 
II 
 
The causal powers which common sense attributes to familiar medium-sized objects include 
many which by nature can be exercised only over long periods of time.  It takes time for a glacier to carve 
a cleft through a range of mountains, and time for a deciduous tree to provide a full circle of shade.  Even 
people have powers which by nature can be exercised only over long periods of time.  Each normal 
person has for example the power to acquire competence in a natural language, but this power can get 
exercised only given years of exposure to appropriate linguistic cues. 
Philosophers who would use Alexander’s Dictum to banish familiar medium-sized objects from 
our ontology will say:  any causing which such an object seems over time to do is really done by some 
plurality of microparticles.  But which plurality of microparticles?  The too-easy answer is:  just those 
microparticles which, at the various moments in the familiar object’s career, jointly occupy exactly that 
volume of space which the familiar object itself occupies.  This answer is too easy since if, objectively, 
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there are in the world no such objects as glaciers and trees and people, there is in the world no such 
feature as a volume’s being occupied by a glacier or a tree or a person. 
If any outcome which seems to be caused by a tree or glacier or person is objectively caused by 
some plurality of microparticles instead, there must be some objective fact of the matter as to which 
microparticles are thus jointly involved in the causing.  This fact of the matter need not be precisely 
defined; “the problem of the many” (Unger 1980; cf. van Inwagen 1990, pp. 214 ff.) suggests that there is 
no precise fact of the matter, at the level of microparticles, as to which microparticles compose a given 
familiar object, and which lie outside its bounds.  And certainly this fact of the matter need not be defined 
once-and-for-all for each familiar object; my point in focussing on causings which by nature take time is 
precisely to remind us that, in respect of many of the causal powers which common sense attributes to 
familiar objects, the banishers of familiar objects will have to award exercise of those powers to shifting 
pluralities of microparticles. 
But it remains true that the banishers of familiar objects will have to find something in the way 
the world is, or the way the world works, in virtue of which at each successive moment it is these 
microparticles and not more or fewer which jointly participate in causing the outcomes which common 
sense attributes to a familiar object.  It is not enough for the banishers to use the familiar adverbial 
construction—e.g. to say that whatever common sense supposes a tree to cause is instead caused by 
microparticles “tree-wise arranged” (Rea forthcoming, pp. 80, 81, 127; van Inwagen 1990, section 11, 
passim). Some account of what it is for microparticles to be “tree-wise arranged” is needed, which 
unmistakably does not quantify over trees. 
To make this challenge as vivid as I can make it, I will shift the example from that of a tree or a 
glacier to that of a person (whom I will call “Max”).  But I will not tax the banisher with telling us which 
microparticles were jointly involved, during one stretch of time or another, in the long labor of building 
Max’s competence in English.  I will merely ask the banisher to say which microparticles are now there, 
where I think Max exists, ready jointly to cause whatever I think Max causes—and to cause it over 
however short a term.  If the banisher cannot do even this, without quantifying over Max himself, it will 
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be clear that he is even less able to inventory the shifting plurality of microparticles which might be 
claimed to have brought about, over the years Max was growing up, Max’s competence in English. 
 
III 
 
The challenge which I set the banisher, then, is this.  What is granted is that in the general area 
where common sense thinks Max exists, there is a vast sea of microparticles.  What needs to be explained 
or analyzed is that within this sea some plurality of microparticles gets assembled as a unified subject of 
causation—as together causing, or between them causing, everything common sense credits Max with 
causing.  The response to this challenge must identify some relation which links each microparticle within 
the plurality to all and only the rest.  Or, if there is ineliminable vagueness about just which microparticles 
together bring about the effects which common sense credits to Max—if there is no precise fact of the 
matter as to which microparticles “the rest” encompasses—the response will identify some relation which 
ties each microparticle within Max to all others up to a vague border, ties each to no microparticles 
beyond that vague border, and neither definitely does nor definitely does not tie each microparticle in 
Max to at least some microparticles that lie within that border. 
But before attempting to identify this relation let us remind ourselves just which microparticles 
we want to see brought together in its grasp.  Behold then Max, running to catch the bus.  Despite the hair 
gel Max uses, his hair is flying in the wind; also, his glasses are starting to slip on the bridge of his nose; 
and his scarf is flapping behind him.  Max should be more warmly dressed:  he is fighting a cold, and 
rhinovirus organisms are present in many of his alveoli. 
What relation obtaining between the microparticles within Max—as common sense would put 
it—connects them, and only them, in a way that remains even after Max is subtracted?  One answer that 
can quickly be dismissed is that the relation is “fellow-travelling”—the relation which obtains between 
microparticle a and microparticle b just in case there is a reliable connection between a’s moving rapidly 
south or north along the sidewalk and b’s moving rapidly south or north along the sidewalk.  For the 
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microparticles in Max’s hair gel “fellow travel” with those in Max’s heart, every bit as much as do the 
microparticles in Max’s scalp; so too do the microparticles in Max’s scarf, in the molecules of air trapped 
within the scarf, and in the rhinoviruses in Max’s lungs.  At the same time at least some microparticles in 
Max’s facial epidermis fail to “fellow travel” with these others:  they are abraded by the wind as Max 
runs. 
What the banisher needs to identify, it seems, is a relation which is not merely spatial but causal.  
We need not pause to debate whether “…is a cause of…” is transitive.4  For even if it is non-transitive, we 
can define an ancestral of it such that if an alteration in microparticle a causes an alteration in 
microparticle b, and an alteration in microparticle b causes an alteration in microparticle c, the alteration 
in microparticle a bears this ancestral causal relation to the alteration in microparticle c.  “Exerts some 
measure of causal influence over” might be a good name for such a long-reaching relation. 
But it seems hard to believe that events befalling an individual microparticle within, say, one of 
Max’s hairs do exert some causal influence over what happens to some individual microparticle in Max’s 
kneecap, while events befalling an individual microparticle in Max’s hair gel do not.  It is even hard to 
believe that there is some one degree of causal influence such that the state of an individual microparticle 
in an individual hair exerts influence of that degree or greater, on the state of an individual kneecap 
microparticle, while an individual microparticle in Max’s hair gel exerts an influence of only a lesser 
degree.  It seems, rather, that an individual microparticle within, say, Max’s heart exerts about as much 
causal influence over what happens to an individual microparticle in the bows of Max’s glasses, as over 
what happens to any individual microparticle in Max’s eyelids.  For the laws of microphysics which 
underwrite such causal influence take no account of whether an individual microparticle being causally 
influenced, or an individual microparticle exercising such causal influence, are located in a plastic object 
or in an organic one. 
Now I do admit that this seems plausible:  that if all the microparticles composing Max’s heart 
were suddenly to undergo some cataclysmic alteration, this would soon make some large difference in the 
careers of the microparticles composing Max’s eyelids, a difference greater than any difference made in 
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the careers of the microparticles composing Max’s glasses.  But can the banisher at this point trade upon 
this thought?  The view he is trying to articulate is that familiar objects—including even hearts and 
eyelids!—do not really cause anything, and do not indeed exist.  Instead certain pluralities of 
microparticles cause all the effects commonly attributed to familiar objects.  But these pluralities have 
determinate, if imprecise, membership; and the banisher’s task at present is to say what it is for just those 
microparticles, and not more or fewer, to make up such a plurality, and to say this in a way which does 
not quantify over familiar objects.  So the challenge which the banisher faces in regard to Max himself is 
a challenge which he also faces in regard to Max’s heart and eyelids and glasses.  He needs to earn the 
right to speak of “all the microparticles composing Max’s heart”. 
The way for him to earn such a right—the right to speak of all the microparticles which lie within 
the bounds of a familiar object, even though there are no such things as familiar objects—is, to repeat, for 
him to identify causal relations which tie individual microparticles within that object to other 
microparticles within it, and to no individual microparticles outside it.  But the prospects for doing this 
are poor.  An individual cell in Max’s eyelids can undergo a rich variety of changes, both healthy and 
unhealthy, and this is a large part of the reason why Max’s heart can exercise great causal influence over 
the state of such a cell—far greater influence than it exercises over the state of Max’s glasses.  But an 
individual microparticle in Max’s eyelids can undergo only a narrowly-defined range of state changes and 
motions.  Hence there are only a few ways in which an individual microparticle in Max’s heart can 
influence the state of an individual microparticle in Max’s eyelids; it only can, in an extremely indirect 
and mediated way, influence motions or state changes in that individual microparticle.  But it can, in an 
equally indirect and mediated way, influence motions and state changes in an individual microparticle just 
beyond (what common sense sees as) the surface of Max’s skin, or even well beyond it; and an individual 
microparticle outside Max’s body altogether—say, in the air blowing on Max’s eyelid—can likewise 
influence the individual microparticles in Max’s eyelids. 
I will now lay my cards on the table:  no causal relation holds each of the microparticles within a 
familiar medium-sized object together with all and only the others—not even roughly all and roughly 
 9
only the others.  So the banisher cannot make out the claim that all the causing which a familiar object 
appears to do really is done by some plurality of microparticles instead.  For he cannot say which 
plurality preempts the claim to causation lodged by the familiar object.  So even if Alexander’s Dictum is 
true, it does not follow that there are in the world no familiar objects. 
 
IV 
 
But there is one sort of case—exceptional but not unthinkable—which may make the position I 
have just laid on the table seem exaggerated.  Suppose that Max stares so intently at the bus he is chasing 
that he runs full-speed into a waist-high post.  Or suppose, less unpleasantly, that a billiard ball is struck 
sharply by a cue stick.  In either case microparticles at the point of impact undergo very sharp alterations 
in their energy states.  They then exercise considerable causal influence over neighboring microparticles, 
altering their energy states in turn.  Thus are causal chains launched which at length embroil, let us 
suppose, every last microparticle within Max or the billiard ball.  Finally let us suppose that these chains 
at length converge on a single microparticle within Max or within the ball.  Then that one microparticle 
has been causally influenced, to a high degree, by all and only the other microparticles in the familiar 
object which common sense recognizes.  The microparticle membership of that familiar object has been 
recaptured at the level of a causal relation between microparticles. 
But note two things about such an example.  First, only one microparticle within the familiar 
object is causally influenced by every last other microparticle within it, and by only those others.  The 
vast majority of microparticles in the familiar object, even on the fanciful hypothesis of convergence, are 
causally influenced by (and themselves in turn causally influence) only some other microparticles within 
the object.  Those at the point of impact moreover are highly influenced by microparticles not within the 
object.  Second, the one microparticle which does momentarily stand in a relation reflecting the exact 
microparticle composition of the familiar object does so only now, only once.  It is too fanciful to suppose 
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that on other occasions of impact, that very microparticle will again be the one on which all causal chains 
converge. 
What far, far more commonly happens is that relations of causal influence link an individual 
microparticle within a familiar object now to some others within the object, now to different others within 
it, now to microparticles largely outside the object.  There is no causal relation which, as a general matter, 
joins individual microparticles within a given familiar object to all and only the others that are within it.  
At the level of microphysics, the microparticle membership of a familiar medium-sized object is causally 
invisible. 
But if so, the claim I made earlier involves no exaggeration after all.  The philosopher who seeks 
to award the causation apparently exercised by familiar objects to pluralities of microparticles instead, 
and who intends in this way to snatch the rug of existence out from under the familiar objects, ends up 
unable to say which pluralities of microparticles receive the awards. 
 
V 
 
At this point the philosopher I have just described—“the banisher”, as I call him—may be 
tempted by moves we have not yet considered. 
His contention is that wherever a familiar object appears to cause some outcome, what really is 
causing that outcome is some plurality of microparticles instead.  We have supposed that the banisher 
would seek plausibility for this contention by following a simple strategy:  he would hold that the 
plurality of microparticles which does the real causing is, in each case, the plurality found just where the 
familiar object appears to exist—the plurality which, as common sense sees things, composes the familiar 
object.  But strictly speaking he need not say this.  He is free to say that the real causal agent is a plurality 
which occupies only part of the volume of the putative familiar object, or a plurality which comprises 
both microparticles within that volume and microparticles without it, or even a plurality which comprises 
microparticles widely scattered. 
 11
We have also supposed that the banisher would agree that when a familiar object appears to bring 
about some result over a long stretch of time, some protracted causation is occurring, and we have 
supposed he would seek to attribute this causation to a shifting plurality of microparticles found (at the 
various moments in this stretch) just where the familiar object appears to be.  This response seemed to 
make the difficulty of his position more vivid:  if the only easy way for him to say which microparticles 
together do the work attributed to a familiar object, at a given time, involves identifying some volume of 
space as the volume occupied by the familiar object, then tracing the membership of a shifting plurality of 
microparticles across a stretch of time would make him rely all the more heavily, it seemed, on the spatio-
temporal career of the familiar object itself. 
But again the banisher is not forced to respond in just this way.  He could dispute the idea that 
there really are any cases of protracted causation, and thus save himself the effort of identifying shifting 
pluralities of microparticles to be the agents of such causation.  He could argue that the only outcomes 
that really get produced in the world are momentary:  momentary microphysical outcomes, which 
compose into momentary macro-arrangements.  When common sense views a series of such 
arrangements, it supposes, e.g., that it witnesses the establishment of a cleft in a mountain range, the 
weakening of a colony of ground plants, the development of linguistic competence in a human.  But the 
banisher’s new position would be that he need not identify any microphysical agent of the causation 
which produces these drawn-out outcomes, because these drawn-out outcomes are not really produced.  
What is produced, he would say—by one plurality of microparticles or another—are momentary stages of 
mountain-shapes, of plant nutrition, of speech dispositions. 
These new responses are available to the banisher, but they are unavailing.  A claim of causal 
exclusion can engender real worry only when its proponent places the true causes, in which she wants us 
to believe, in the very places and roles we supposed occupied by the false causes in which we formerly 
believed.  We can be made to worry that the work we commonly attributed to a given familiar object is 
really being done, instead, by microparticles located just where that object appears to exist.  If the 
proponent of causal exclusion instead tells us that microparticles both within and without that familiar 
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object together are causing those familiar effects—or, more radically, that microparticles widely separated 
from one another are together causing those familiar effects—we naturally start to wonder why we should 
believe that microparticles thus distributed together cause anything.  It is natural to suspect that we are 
being invited to commit the Fallacy of Composition (Elder 2000). 
Similarly, if a proponent of causal exclusion tells us that the very outcomes we every day see 
being produced are being produced by causes we had not suspected, she commands our worries.  But if 
she tells us that drawn-out outcomes which we think we all the time see being produced by familiar 
objects really are not produced at all—and that this helps show that since Alexander’s Dictum is true, 
familiar objects do not exist—she engenders scepticism rather than worry.  A position which defends 
itself by simply asserting that mountain passes do not get carved over time by glaciers, or that people do 
not over time acquire linguistic competence, is too close to one which merely asserts that there are no 
mountains and no people to qualify as a persuasive argument to that effect. 
 
VI 
 
Causal exclusion arguments constitute a direct attack, launched from Alexander’s Dictum, on the 
reality of familiar objects.  But an indirect attack can also be launched from Alexander’s Dictum, which 
targets at least some familiar objects.  The route here lies through properties:  one argues that Alexander’s 
Dictum shows that certain apparently familiar properties do not really exist, and one then points out that 
these properties are essential properties of certain apparently familiar objects—properties which those 
objects must have, in order to exist at all.  One concludes that the objects in question do not exist at all. 
A step that has actually been taken along this indirect route is to claim that historical properties 
do no causal work (following Enç and Adams 1992, pp. 637-638; cf. Antony 1996, pp. 72-73, Slutsky 
2001, pp. 596-598), from which it would follow, by Alexander’s Dictum, that there are no such 
properties.  This in turn could be said to have two consequences for the ontology of common sense.  The 
consequence harder to explain is that there are in the world no beliefs and no desires (Millikan 1984, 
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Millikan 1986).  The more straightforward consequence is that there are no organs or other biological 
devices (and no artifacts either, though that again is harder to explain; see Elder forthcoming). 
I now will set forth the thinking that animates this attack on familiar objects—on only some 
familiar objects, but very familiar ones at that—but will do so in only a brief and incomplete way.  For the 
first question to which we should give detailed attention is the prior question of what, exactly, 
Alexander’s Dictum does say about properties. 
Biological devices appear to fall into natural kinds—there are human hearts, eagles’ eyes, etc.—
and the devices in each kind appear to be essentially characterized by distinctive functions (Elder 1995, 
Elder 1996).  Human hearts are supposed to pump blood.  The double-lensed eyes of eagles are supposed 
to enable the detection of prey from distances as great as 900 feet.  But individual devices which have a 
certain function may not perform it, and may not be able to perform it.  There are malformed hearts and 
malformed eyes, and these really are hearts and eyes, even though they do not do what they are supposed 
to.  This sort of point leads a number of philosophers to suppose that the functions of a particular 
biological device cannot be analyzed as dispositions of that device.  Rather they must be analyzed in 
historical terms.  Biological devices are by nature the products of certain processes of copying or 
replication, and if what has caused past devices (tokens) bearing a particular shape to get copied over and 
over again has been that those devices often enough did φ, then present devices (tokens) bearing that 
shape are supposed to φ, they have φ-ing as their “proper function” (to use Ruth Millikan’s term; Millikan 
1984).  Hence human hearts are essentially characterized by a certain historical property—they have been 
copied from similarly-shaped items as a causal consequence of those items’ having pumped blood.  
Eagles’ eyes likewise are essentially characterized by a historical property.  If Alexander’s Dictum entails 
that there really are no historical properties, there really are no human hearts or eagles’ eyes. 
But does Alexander’s Dictum really entail this—just what does it say about properties?  “Being is 
said in many ways”, Aristotle taught us, and just so Alexander’s Dictum must be said in different ways.  
As said of properties, I shall take it that it says this:  for a property to be real—for it to be a genuine way 
things can be—is for it to bestow upon the things that have it causal powers. 
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But then is Alexander’s Dictum, as applied to properties, still so bland as to be scarcely worth 
stating—or is it so strong as to be scarcely believable?  The question arises because many properties, 
which intuitively seem decidedly real, also seem to bestow on their bearers no causal powers in particular.  
Colors, for example—assuming arguendo that colors are properties5—seem not to make any particular 
difference in the ways their bearers act.  Neither do tastes or smells.  That a leaf is dark green rather than 
light green seems to make no difference in how much shade it provides or how much water it traps; that 
certain leaves have a skunky smell, rather than a grassy smell, seems to make no difference in how much 
nutrition they provide their hosts. 
Or rather an object’s color or smell or taste can carry consequences, but only consequences 
mediated by the responses of one or another sentient creature.  Colors provide camouflage and hence 
protection; smells attract pollinators or repel herbivores.  Redness can cause a flower to get picked by a 
human seeking to make a bright bouquet, and lilac-smell can cause a different flower to get picked by 
humans fond of a certain scent.  There seem to be many genuine properties, then, which directly and 
proximally bestow only one causal power on their bearers:  they bestow on their bearers the power to 
elicit true perceptual judgements (or more generally true occasion-judgements) to the effect that they are 
present in their bearers—or that other properties are present which, in bearers of that kind, accompany 
those properties.6  All further consequences that such properties bear are functions of the desires and 
dispositions of the sentient agents that detect them. 
Is it enough to satisfy Alexander’s Dictum, that a property bestow on its bearers the power to 
make minds detect, or respond to, its presence?  On that interpretation the Dictum is as bland as it seemed 
at the outset of this paper, and as undeniable.  Who would want to affirm the reality of properties the 
presence of which cannot, even in principle, be detected—not via any associated powers over non-
sentient entities, and not via responses to that property by sentient creatures? 
But philosophers inclined to suppose that Alexander’s Dictum rules out the reality of biological 
devices—or, by a route I have not space to narrate, of beliefs and desires—evidently give a far stronger 
reading to it.  For they cannot plausibly maintain that historical properties cannot ever be detected.  They 
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must in particular admit that we can empirically determine which performances it is, for which at least 
some biological devices (types) have been naturally selected—which performances are the proper 
functions of these devices.  To deny that would be to deny that evolutionary biology is an empirical 
science!  Rather, these banishers of historical properties must be reading Alexander’s Dictum as saying 
that to be real, a property must not just be detectable, but must confer causal properties not mediated by 
its detection (or by any responses which it causes in sentient creatures). 
On such a reading the Dictum no longer is bland; but it no longer is believable, either.  For 
compare:  just what powers are bestowed on a thing by its being three feet in diameter, or 4’8” tall, or 
oval in shape?  Well, at the least, the powers to pass the various tests that might be devised, for diameter 
and height and shape.  But what further powers?  It seems that any further consequences of these 
properties will, in general, depend on the desires and interests of the testers.  In a woodsman intent on 
milling planks that are 2½  feet wide, a tree trunk’s being three feet in diameter will trigger not just 
detection of its own presence, but destruction of the tree.  But failing an appropriate perceiver, the tree 
trunk’s being three feet in diameter will have no “consequences” that are not simply equivalent (under 
natural law) to its being three feet in diameter. 
The reasonable reading is that with properties as with property bearers, Alexander’s Dictum is so 
bland as to be scarcely worth stating.  By no routes does it shake the Moorings of our common-sense 
ontology. 
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Footnotes  
                                                           
1 Exceptions include Sturgeon 1998, e.g. at p. 418 (“a physicalism that is both general and 
severe”), and Yablo 1992. 
2 Jaegwon Kim’s widely-known presentation of the causal exclusion worry goes just a bit 
differently.  To have caused the cleft in the mountain range, Kim would say, the movement of the glacier 
would have had to cause the complex sequence of microparticle movements which subvened the 
establishment of the cleft (Kim 1998, p. 35 ff.).  But the set of microparticle movements which subvened 
the movement of the glacier itself has an unassailable claim to having caused the cleft-subvening 
sequence.  So, barring causal overdetermination, the movement of the glacier cannot itself have caused 
that sequence, and hence cannot really have caused the cleft to get established.  Where my presentation 
differs is in avoiding the sort of claim presented in the first sentence.  Stephen Yablo has shown that 
causes must be “commensurate” with their effects (Yablo 1992), and from this it follows that the first 
sentence may voice an unfair, exaggerated requirement.  Of course the movement of the glacier was not 
sufficient to ensure just that microparticle version of the establishment of the cleft; at best, it sufficed to 
ensure the occurrence of some microparticle version or other of a cleft-establishment.   
3 Peter Unger, who twenty years ago used compositional vagueness to argue that “There Are No 
Ordinary Things” (this is the title of Unger 1979), did also recognize various unfamiliar medium-sized 
objects.  These are essentially characterized by precise boundaries, and as such are immune to the sorites 
paradoxes mentioned here in the text. Recent papers on “the problem of coinciding objects” have 
recognized kindred unfamiliar medium-sized objects; some or all of these are likewise immune to sorites 
paradoxes. (There is for example the parcel of gold, found exactly where the golden statue is, which 
cannot survive the removal of even a single gold atom; there is also the coinciding mass of gold, which 
can survive dispersal but ceases to exist if even one component atom is destroyed—see fns. 1 and 2 in 
Burke 1994).  Moreover, all these unfamiliar objects, including Unger’s, are untouched by the points I 
make below about the shifting microparticle membership of familiar medium-sized objects But common 
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sense attributes causal efficacy not to any of these unfamiliar medium-sized objects, but only to the 
familiar ones.  That is why I discuss only the familiar medium-sized objects—“familiar objects”, for 
short.  (But I should add that there is reason to think medium-sized objects of all these unfamiliar sorts do 
not really exist; Elder 1998).      
4 In fact my position is that causation is non-transitive:  see Elder 2001a, Elder 2001b. 
5 In fact I think there are no such properties as colors.  The reason is that sameness in color does 
not amount to an objective sameness among the objects which bear it to one another; the physical features 
which produce perception of a given color are simply too diverse (Clark 2000, Chapter 6).  But had the 
perception of a given color corresponded to a single, simple property in the things in which it is 
perceived—e.g. to a single wavelength of light—I would think there to be no argument against the reality 
of colors, their causal flabbiness notwithstanding. 
6 It is somewhat artificial to speak of bees making perceptual judgements, because this suggests 
that bees have beliefs—and that the belief / desire contrast applies to bee psychology.  The more plausible 
claim is that bees’ thoughts belong to a simpler kind, a primitive ancestor of both beliefs and desires, 
which is neither purely a belief nor purely a desire.  Ruth Millikan calls such thoughts “pushmi-pullyu 
representations” (Millikan 1996).  So a crisper (though more cumbersome) statement of the thought in 
this paragraph is that many properties directly and proximally bestow on their bearers only the power to 
elicit, from some sentient creature or other, representations which under their indicative aspect are 
judgements that that property—or another associated with that property—is present in the bearers.  
(Under its indicative aspect, the bee’s representation says “nectar here now”; under its other aspect, its 
imperative aspect, it says “insert mouth and suck here now”.) 
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